Defensive Researches and Management

Defensive Researches and Management

The Crisis of Victory in Asymmetric Wars: Explaining the Gap between Israel's Tactical Success and Strategic Failure in West Asia (2006–2026)

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Mohammed Jalali Far 1
Behzad Ghasemi 2
1 Imam Hossein University
2 Imam Hussein University Faculty
Abstract
This article examines the gap between tactical success and strategic failure of the Israeli regime in asymmetric wars in West Asia from 2006 to 2026. The central question is why Israel, despite its military, intelligence, and technological superiority, has consistently failed to translate tactical achievements into strategic victory. The hypothesis posits that Israel's military superiority does not lead to sustainable strategic gains due to four interrelated factors: the adaptive learning of asymmetric adversaries, the regeneration of resistance capacity, domestic political constraints, and the progressive erosion of deterrence. The theoretical framework is grounded in defensive structural realism and introduces two analytical innovations—the "tactical‑strategic gap" model and the concept of the "crisis of victory."Findings reveal that during 2023–2026, Israel achieved unprecedented superiority in seven domains—layered air defense, autonomous drones, artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, space dominance, an innovation ecosystem, and U.S. support. However, six structural factors prevented these assets from yielding strategic outcomes: military primacy over policymaking, weak civilian oversight, rising right‑wing extremism, the absence of a coherent strategic framework, a widening gap between military image and strategic reality, and demographic constraints. Concurrently, the resistance's adaptive learning—through decentralized command, a "mosaic defense" doctrine, and redefining victory as survival and cost imposition—has steadily eroded Israeli deterrence. By advancing the "tactical‑strategic gap" model, this article demonstrates that Israel's military superiority in asymmetric warfare fails to produce strategic victory, underscoring the need to reconceptualize classical theories of power.
Keywords
Asymmetric War
Deterrence. Tactical Success
Strategic Failure
Subjects
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  • Receive Date 02 July 2026
  • Revise Date 15 August 2026
  • Accept Date 05 September 2026