جنگ هیبریدی روسیه در قبال جمهوری اوکراین با تاکید بر راهبرد اطلاعاتی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 نویسنده مسئول: استادیار، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

2 کارشناس ارشد دفاع غیرعامل، موسسه آموزشی تحقیقاتی صنایع دفاع

چکیده

در شرایطی که نزدیک به شش سال از آغاز بحران اوکراین و سرنگونی دولت طرفدار مسکو در کی‌یف می‌گذرد، طرح‌ دیدگاه‌های متفاوت در خصوص رفتار روسیه در قبال بحران اوکراین همچنان ادامه دارد. هدف این مقاله بررسی چرایی و چگونگی طولانی‌شدن بحران اوکراین از سال 2013 تا 2018 می‌باشد. جهت نیل به مقصود، راهبرد روسیه در اوکراین و چرایی آن، مسئله اصلی است که نوشتار پیش‌رو تلاش می‌کند تا با مدل آاسکوپ و با بهره‌گیری از جنگ هیبریدی بدان بپردازد. براین اساس سوال اصلی مقاله بدین‌گونه است که فدراسیون روسیه چگونه از جنگ اطلاعاتی برای نفوذ بر جمعیت غیرنظامی اوکراین استفاده کرده است؟ در پاسخ به این پرسش این فرضیه از سوی نویسندگان مطرح شده که هدف اساسی روسیه بازگشت به جایگاه ابرقدرتی و تغییر موازنه به سود خود در مناسبات با غرب است. چون کسب این هدف، دیگر به شیوه‌های جنگ متقارن و سنتی امکان‌پذیر نیست، مسکو به نسل نوین جنگ‌ها یعنی جنگ هیبریدی و بهره‌گیری از ابزارهای متعدد و متنوع آن همچون حمله‌های سایبری، انتشار اخبار نادرست و جعلی روی آورده است. در این راستا با بهره‌گیری از مدل آاسکوپ به بررسی منطقه، ساختارها، ظرفیت‌ها، سازمان‌ها، افراد و رویدادهای بحران اوکراین می‌پردازیم تا از طریق این مدل ضمن تشریح وقایع موجود و دلایل پیش آمده بحران 2014م، روش‌هایی که روسیه به وسیله آن بعضی از مناطق اوکراین را به کنترل خودش درآورد و بخشی از جمعیت غیرنظامی را به سوی خود جلب کرد، متمرکز می‌شویم. روش انجام این پژوهش توصیفی- تحلیلی و مبتنی بر گردآوری داده‌های مستخرج از منابع معتبر علمی شامل کتاب‌ها، مقالات علمی- پژوهشی و سایت‌های اینترنتی می‌باشد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Russia's Hybrid War against the Republic of Ukraine, Emphasis on Intelligence Strategy

نویسندگان [English]

  • Danial Rezapoor 1
  • Abulfazl Majidi 2
1 Corresponding Author: Assistant Professor, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
2 Master of Passive Defense, Defense Industries Research Training Institute
چکیده [English]

After nearly six years of the start of the Ukraine crisis and the overthrow of the pro-Moscow government in Kiev, various views on Russia's behavior in the Ukraine crisis is still being presented. This research is intended to investigate why and how the Ukraine crisis continued from 2013 to 2018. Accordingly, Russia's strategy in Ukraine and the reasons behind it, make the main concern of this study which is addressed through ASCOPE model using hybrid warfare. Hence, the main question of the study involves how the Russian Federation used information warfare to influence the civilian population of Ukraine. In response to this question, the authors hypothesize that Russia's main goal concerns gaining the position of a superpower again and change the balance in its favor in competition with the West. As achieving the goal is no longer possible through symmetrical and traditional methods of warfare, Moscow has resorted to the new generation of warfare, i.e., hybrid warfare, using its wide-ranging tools such as cyber-attacks and communicating false news. Employing the ASCOPE model, the researchers have investigated the region, structures, capacities, organizations, individuals and the events of the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. The methods through which the Russia gained control of some regions by attracting parts of the civilian population, are also considered. This descriptive-analytical research is based on collecting data extracted from reliable scientific sources including books, scientific-research articles and Internet sites.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Hybrid warfare
  • information warfare
  • civilian population
  • ASCOPE method
  • propaganda

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